As Defense Minister Mario Andrésol moves to rewrite the rules and doctrine of the Armed Forces of Haiti, the country faces a harder question: can the FAd’H become a young, professional, accountable fighting force capable of defending the state without repeating the abuses and political interference that destroyed its predecessor?
PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti — Haiti is again trying to build an army while much of the country is living through precisely the kind of national-security emergency an effective armed force is supposed to help the state confront.
Defense Minister Mario Andrésol met this week with the High Command of the Armed Forces of Haiti, or FAd’H, to continue work on new general regulations for the institution. According to the Ministry of Defense, the September 9 session examined the military’s proposed organizational structure, responsibilities and operating procedures, while senior officers submitted recommendations intended to improve coordination within the force. The ministry says a new military doctrine is also nearing completion.
The initiative deserves to be taken seriously. Haiti needs functioning national institutions, and a professional defense force can have a legitimate place among them.
But rewriting regulations is not the same thing as rebuilding an army.
The more important questions are considerably harder: What threat is this army being built to confront? Who selected the doctrine? What evidence and threat assessment shaped it? What qualifications determine who becomes a soldier or officer? How are promotions awarded? How young and physically capable is the operational force? Who controls procurement? What separates military responsibilities from policing? And how will Haiti prevent its new army from becoming another institution built around political connections, patronage and personalities?
Those questions are particularly urgent because Haiti has tried this before.
And the history of the old FAd’H explains why rebuilding it requires much more than uniforms, weapons and a new organizational chart.
Why Haiti Dismantled Its Army
The disappearance of the old Haitian military in 1995 cannot accurately be explained simply as a foreign decision to deprive Haiti of an army.
Its history was considerably darker.
For decades, Haiti’s military was deeply involved in domestic politics. Rather than concentrating primarily on external defense, the armed forces repeatedly became an instrument for controlling political power.
The decisive rupture came after the 1991 military coup that overthrew President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti’s first democratically elected president.
Human Rights Watch documented widespread killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, beatings, rape and extortion during the military regime that followed. The organization estimated that 3,000 to 4,000 Haitians were killed in political violence during the three years after the coup, much of it directly or indirectly associated with the military and allied paramilitary forces.
Approximately 100,000 Haitians fled abroad and an estimated 300,000 were internally displaced during that period, according to Human Rights Watch.
Following the U.S.-led multinational intervention authorized by the United Nations in 1994 and Aristide’s return to office, the government progressively dismantled the military.
By early 1995, senior officers had been removed, thousands of soldiers had been dismissed or demobilized, the Defense Ministry had effectively ceased functioning and Haiti began building a separate civilian police institution—the Haitian National Police.
There was a reason for that separation.
Historically, Haiti’s military had performed policing functions as well as military ones. In rural communities, notorious section chiefs exercised enormous authority over civilians. A professional civilian police force was intended to place ordinary law enforcement under a different institutional structure.
Even the transitional decision to recycle former soldiers into an interim police force produced problems. Human Rights Watch reported that roughly 3,400 soldiers were selected for the interim force after only six days of training and inadequate human-rights vetting.
That history offers an important lesson for today’s government:
Haiti’s challenge is not simply to restore an army. It is to avoid restoring the institutional culture that made the old army dangerous.
The Army Returned in 2017
President Jovenel Moïse formally restored the FAd’H in 2017, more than two decades after its dismantling.
Since then, Haiti has gradually recruited soldiers, rebuilt military infrastructure and sought training assistance from foreign partners.
The effort accelerated as gangs expanded.
Mexico has become an important training partner. In 2025, 143 Haitian soldiers—including 15 women—completed an eight-week basic military program in Mexico covering areas including weapons training, personal defense and human rights. Haiti subsequently sent another contingent of about 150 soldiers for additional training as part of an agreement intended to train hundreds of Haitian personnel.
The United Nations has also identified expansion of the FAd’H as part of Haiti’s longer-term security-capacity development. A 2026 U.N. planning document listed approximately 3,000 recruited and trained FAd’H soldiers, including at least 150 women, against a longer-term target of 12,000.
Those numbers illustrate the central problem.
Haiti is attempting to rebuild a national military while simultaneously confronting an armed-security emergency vastly beyond the capabilities of the institution it currently possesses.
If Haiti Has an Army, Why Do Gangs Still Control Territory?
This is the question many Haitians understandably ask.
The answer is more complicated than whether soldiers are courageous.
A United Nations report published this year found that gangs continued to control large areas of the West, Centre and Artibonite departments. Despite intensified operations by Haitian authorities and outside support, the U.N. reported that no gang-controlled territory had been fully recovered by security forces at the time of its assessment.
Reuters reported this week that armed groups are increasingly shifting operations beyond Port-au-Prince into rural areas, using kidnappings, roadblocks, cattle theft and hit-and-run operations while security efforts remain heavily concentrated around the capital.
This does not establish that Haitian soldiers lack courage.
There is no credible empirical basis for judging an entire military’s willingness to fight from nationality, age or the present territorial map.
What the evidence does demonstrate is a severe capacity problem.
An army needs far more than motivated soldiers. It needs intelligence, communications, logistics, transport, command-and-control systems, medical evacuation, maintenance, reliable ammunition management, engineering capability, disciplined leadership, training, salaries, fuel, secure bases and an accountable chain of command.
Without those systems, even courageous soldiers can become strategically ineffective.
Gangs Are Not Simply a Better “Army”
There is nevertheless an uncomfortable comparison worth examining.
Haiti’s major armed groups have demonstrated organization, territorial knowledge, recruitment capacity, intelligence networks and an ability to coordinate violence.
But calling them a superior army would confuse criminal effectiveness with military professionalism.
A professional soldier operates under law, command responsibility, rules governing the use of force and obligations toward civilians.
Gang members do not.
Their demonstrated willingness to kill or die therefore cannot by itself be treated as evidence of military professionalism.
There is, however, a deeper lesson.
Armed groups have successfully recruited young Haitians partly because they can provide money, identity, protection, status and belonging where legitimate institutions often cannot. Reports have documented the recruitment and exploitation of minors and young people by Haitian armed groups.
The state therefore has to compete for Haiti’s young people—not by transforming gang formations into military units, but by offering a lawful alternative.
A credible FAd’H could provide disciplined national service, education, technical skills, engineering training, emergency-response capabilities and a professional career to qualified young Haitians who might otherwise see few opportunities.
Former gang members who have committed serious crimes cannot simply be absorbed into the armed forces. Any reintegration program would require individual screening, disarmament, accountability and strict exclusion of people implicated in serious human-rights abuses.
But Haiti’s youth should unquestionably be central to rebuilding the institution.
A Modern Army Needs a Generational Renewal
The Haitian Tribune found no credible evidence supporting a universal claim that the world’s strongest militaries are “95% young soldiers.” Military age structures differ significantly by country and by occupation.
The broader principle, however, is valid: front-line forces require personnel capable of meeting demanding physical and operational standards.
That does not mean older officers have no place.
Experienced officers and noncommissioned officers are essential for command, instruction, planning, logistics, intelligence and institutional memory.
The mistake would be confusing seniority with readiness.
A 60-year-old officer may possess invaluable strategic experience. That does not mean a 60-year-old should occupy a position designed for physically demanding infantry operations.
Likewise, youth alone does not make a competent soldier.
The appropriate standard is straightforward: the right person, with the right qualifications, in the right position.
Haiti’s military personnel system should therefore establish transparent age, fitness, education, training and promotion standards for every occupational category—and apply them regardless of political connections.
The Payroll Cannot Be a Retirement Program
This is where professionalization becomes political.
If recruitment and promotion are determined by friendship, political loyalty, family relationships or the need to reward influential patrons, Haiti will not create a professional army.
It will create an armed patronage system.
International defense-reform experience consistently emphasizes transparent personnel management, merit-based advancement, accountable budgeting and democratic civilian control.
NATO’s defense-institution-building framework, for example, stresses transparent personnel practices, financial planning, resource allocation and professional military education. Its Building Integrity program identifies corruption and poor governance as direct threats to military effectiveness because they waste resources and undermine public trust.
Those principles are applicable whether or not Haiti has any relationship with NATO.
A modern FAd’H should therefore maintain a verified digital personnel system identifying every soldier, assignment, qualification, salary and duty status.
Ghost employees should be impossible.
Promotions should require documented qualifications.
Senior appointments should be subject to transparent legal procedures.
Procurement should be auditable.
And an independent inspector general should be empowered to investigate corruption, weapons diversion, payroll fraud and abuse.
These are not administrative luxuries.
They are combat-readiness issues.
A 2025 U.N. sanctions-panel report provides a warning: Haitian authorities issued warrants for three FAd’H soldiers accused of deserting without returning military weapons and ammunition.
A rifle that disappears from a military armory can eventually become a weapon pointed at another Haitian soldier or civilian.
Andrésol’s New Regulations Deserve Scrutiny
That brings Haiti back to this week’s meeting.
The Ministry of Defense says Andrésol and the High Command are finalizing general regulations defining the FAd’H’s organization, responsibilities and operating procedures. A complementary military doctrine is also being developed.
That is potentially important progress.
But the government should publish enough information for Haitians to understand the intellectual foundation of the reform.
Who drafted the regulations?
Which Haitian military and civilian experts participated?
Were constitutional lawyers consulted?
Were lessons from the pre-1995 FAd’H incorporated?
Were the failures of the restored force since 2017 independently evaluated?
Were international military standards studied?
Was a national threat assessment completed first?
Were the PNH, border authorities, judiciary, civil society and human-rights specialists consulted?
What measurable capabilities is Haiti trying to build over five, 10 and 20 years?
The Haitian Tribune has not located publicly available documentation answering all of those questions.
That does not mean the research does not exist. It means the government should make the process more transparent.
A doctrine gains legitimacy when citizens understand the problem it was designed to solve.
Build From the Mission Up—not From the Generals Down
Before Haiti decides how many generals, colonels, bases or battalions it needs, it should define what the military actually exists to do.
The Constitution provides for armed forces, while democratic defense practice calls for a clear legal framework defining the relationship between civilian government and military authority. DCAF and NATO guidance emphasize civilian supremacy, legislative oversight, transparent budgets, professional education and political neutrality.
For Haiti, that suggests a force built around a limited number of clearly defined missions.
The FAd’H could reasonably concentrate on territorial and border security; support to civilian authorities during major national-security emergencies; military engineering and disaster response; protection of critical national infrastructure; maritime and coastal support where legally authorized; logistics; and specialized support to the PNH against heavily armed organizations when civilian authorities lawfully require it.
Routine criminal investigation and neighborhood policing should remain primarily police responsibilities.
That distinction matters because Haiti already learned what happens when the army becomes the everyday police.
Seven Foundations for a New FAd’H
Based on established defense-institution-building practices, Haiti’s modernization effort should concentrate on seven foundations rather than simply expanding headcount: mission, recruitment, training, leadership, logistics, accountability and civilian control.
Recruitment should be national and competitive, with published standards covering education, physical fitness, medical fitness, background investigations and aptitude. Women should have genuine career paths throughout the institution.
Training should begin with a standardized basic course and continue throughout a soldier’s career. Weapons proficiency is only one component. Soldiers need instruction in military law, human rights, first aid, communications, discipline, civilian protection, ethics and rules governing force.
Haiti also needs a professional noncommissioned officer corps. Sergeants are the institutional backbone of many effective militaries because they turn commanders’ orders into disciplined small-unit performance.
Officer promotion should depend on education, command performance and professional development rather than proximity to political power.
Logistics should receive the same attention as combat units. A battalion without reliable fuel, maintenance, communications, ammunition control and medical support exists largely on paper.
Finally, Haiti should establish external oversight. Parliament, when constitutionally functioning, should scrutinize defense budgets and legislation. Independent auditors and inspectors should be able to examine procurement and personnel practices.
That is how an army becomes an institution rather than an armed political network.
Who Is the Boss?
This question carries enormous historical weight in Haiti.
The answer in a sovereign democratic system should not be Washington, an embassy, a political party, a wealthy family, a foreign government—or a general.
The military’s ultimate authority must come from Haiti’s Constitution and lawful civilian institutions.
Foreign governments undeniably possess substantial influence in Haiti. International donors finance major programs; foreign governments provide security assistance; and outside diplomatic actors have repeatedly played important roles during Haitian political transitions.
That history has fueled a widespread belief that important decisions about Haiti are sometimes made outside Haiti.
Former Senator Joseph Lambert has himself made claims concerning foreign pressure and Haitian political outcomes. But The Haitian Tribune could not independently establish the specific allegation presented to us that foreign officials asked Lambert to help rig a Haitian election. Without documentary evidence, corroborating testimony or another independently verifiable source, such a claim should be presented as an allegation, not an established fact.
There is documented evidence of significant international involvement in Haitian political affairs. For example, after President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination in 2021, the United States, United Nations and other members of the Core Group publicly encouraged Ariel Henry to form a government during the succession struggle involving Claude Joseph, Henry and Lambert.
That is evidence of diplomatic influence.
It is not evidence that a foreign government rigged an election.
Those are fundamentally different claims.
Haiti Cannot Afford Another Political Army
The greatest danger in rebuilding the FAd’H is not that Haiti might have an army.
It is that Haiti might rebuild the wrong army.
The country does not need an institution designed around nostalgia for the old FAd’H. Nor does it need a collection of senior titles without operational capability.
It needs soldiers who can move, communicate and operate professionally; officers who understand strategy rather than politics; NCOs capable of enforcing standards; logisticians who can keep units functioning; investigators who can account for every weapon; civilian officials capable of managing defense policy; and an inspectorate capable of punishing corruption.
Above all, it needs an institution whose loyalty is to the Republic rather than an individual.
The Real Test Will Not Be the New Document
Mario Andrésol is correct on one fundamental point: modernization cannot be measured solely by weapons, vehicles and buildings. Haiti’s own government says the FAd’H continues to face deficiencies in equipment, training and logistics.
New regulations and a new doctrine can help.
But paper reforms will mean little if recruitment remains politicized, promotions reward connections, equipment disappears, training is inconsistent or commanders are selected for loyalty rather than competence.
Haiti’s history makes the stakes unusually high.
The old military accumulated so much political power—and became associated with such extensive repression—that the government eventually dismantled it.
Thirty-one years later, Haiti faces the opposite nightmare: armed criminal organizations have exploited the weakness of state institutions and established control over communities, transportation routes and economic territory.
The lesson from those two eras is not that Haiti must choose between an abusive army and no effective army.
There is a third possibility.
Haiti can build a younger, disciplined, technically competent and politically neutral defense force under democratic civilian authority.
But that requires something more difficult than buying weapons or adding soldiers to a payroll.
It requires building an institution.
And if the government wants Haitians to trust that institution, the modernization of the FAd’H should begin with the same principles expected from the soldiers who will eventually defend the Republic:
standards, discipline, transparency, accountability and service to Haiti—not to a person.
The Haitian Tribune | Analysis & National Security
